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Abstract 
The presence of nuclear weapons in North Korea has 
complicated the strategic scenario in North Asia in 
general and Korean peninsula in particular. Unless the 
perceived ‗security deficit‘ with North Korea, due to its 
nuclear weapons‘ programme is amicably addressed, 
especially by reducing America‘s dominant presence in 
the region, demanding North Korea‘s denuclearisation 
would be unrealistic. Thus, the nuclear imbroglio in 
Korean Peninsula would endure. The outcomes of the 
Korean crisis will have serious spillover effects on South 
and East Asia. As a ‗rising‘ super power, India needs to 
reflect on her role in the unfolding strategic scene in its 
extended neighbourhood. This article provides an 
analysis of the strategic condition India is in and the 
impact of intervening in nuclear issues involving Super 
Powers in South and East Asia. 
Keywords: Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Deterrence, Nuclear 
Proliferation, Nuclear Strategy, Denuclearisation, North Korea, 
Korean Peninsula  
1. Introduction 
The geostrategic imbroglio in the Korean peninsula is the most 
enduring bout of the Cold War. Seven decades after the Korean 
War of the 1950s, no tangible peace could be achieved. Caught 
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among powerful demagogues (USA, China, Russia, Japan, and 
South Korea) with their own conflicting agendas, and Pyongyang‘s 
own sense of ‗small country‘ syndrome, the authoritarian regime of 
Kim Jung-Un took refuge of nuclear deterrence to address the fear 
of regime ouster. The emergence of nuclear weapons in the region 
has drastically altered the strategic balance in DPRK‘s favour but 
stranded the regional strategic environment at a crossroad. The 
current strategic ―developments in the region have the potential to 
bring in a fundamental realignment in the [global] balance of 
power‖ (Pant, 2018) which may not be of India‘s liking. An aspiring 
superpower is supposed to shoulder global responsibilities. Should 
India, as one aspirant, be a muted spectator? What role should 
India play in the unfolding power game in North Asia that could 
lead towards a peaceful settlement? 
2. An Introspection 
After a stretch of shadow boxing between North Korea and 
America, Pyongyang has opened to the world. The meeting 
between two Korean leaders in Panmunjom in April 2018 and 
subsequent summit meeting between the North Korean leader Kim 
Jong-Un and American President Donald Trump in Singapore in 
June 2018 have undoubtedly paused the ‗game of nerves‘ as Kim 
pledged to work towards ‗denuclearization‘ in exchange for 
guarantee of his regime security (The New York Times, 2018). 
However, given ―North Korea‘s history of duplicity, broken 
pledges‖ (The Crisis Group, 2018) and America‘s strategic interests 
and overwhelming presence in the region, Korean strategic theatre 
still gives a sense of a nightmarish war.  
Whatever may be the end result, for the time being, Pyongyang 
seems to have effectively deterred Washington‘s fire and furry and 
stands apart from other fated autocratic regimes like Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, who perished for 
they had no promising nuclear weapons capability. Realistically, 
the introduction of nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula, first 
by the USA and subsequently by North Korea, has left no room for 
military manoeuvre, turning the regional strategic environment 
towards a ‗balance of terror‘. 
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A serious concern is the ‗domino effect‘ of nuclear weapons with 
North Korea in the region and the globe. It would be premature to 
deduce any conclusion whether South Korea or Japan will opt for 
the nuclear weapons rout. Countries like UK and France have gone 
disbelieving America‘s nuclear umbrella; meanwhile, the world has 
only one precedent of a complete reversal of nuclear weapons 
programme – South Africa. Only time will prove if the Korean 
Peninsula will be allowed to achieve Nuclear Weapons Free Zone 
(NWFZ) status by withdrawing nuclear umbrella extended by the 
USA and rolling back of Pyongyang‘s strategic programme. 
Moreover, given the complexity, nothing can be ascertained 
regarding the freshly initiated inter-Korean and USA-North Korea 
dialogue. Is the grand bargain of ‗denuclearization‘ by North Korea 
in return of ‗demilitarization‘ of Korean peninsula the answer to 
heralding lasting peace in the region? Will the Korean peninsula be 
nuclear-weapons-free-zone anytime soon? America‘s current policy 
of ―selective engagement and partial commitment to defend allies‖ 
might strengthen the doubt on the reliability of the US security 
guarantee and extended deterrence. Is the world then going to see 
more nuclear weapon states soon? 
3. How it Happened 
Arguably, the current Northeast Asian security environment is 
largely made in USA or result of ―America‘s fault‖ (Keating, 2017). 
The root of the problem can be traced back to Cold War, and 
specifically to the Korean War that ended with an Armistice 
Agreement but not with a permanent peace agreement in 1953 
(Waxman, 2018). As a matter of fact, in violation of the Article II, 
section 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement, the US installed ―more 
than 1720 nuclear weapons in South Korea making it the biggest 
nuclear warehouse till the 1980s‖(Vaddi, 2018). In addition, the 
joint military exercises numbering around 40 annually between 
South Korea and USA troops with nuclear-powered submarines 
have escalated the military tension in the Korean Peninsula, and 
strongly perceived by Pyongyang as preparations for a preemptive 
attack on North Korea (Vaddi, 2018). During the Cold War, the 
Soviet Union was managing and protecting its satellites including 
North Korea against US threats. With the disintegration of Soviet 
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Union, Pyongyang found to be out of the orbit and resorted to a 
self-help strategy. It introduced the Songun ‗Military First‘ policy 
during the 1990s to protect its sovereignty; it is believed that this 
was the starting-point of North Korea‘s nuclear ambition (Vaddi, 
2018). 
Even at the height of the Cold War tensions, the then North Korean 
leader Kim II-Sung floated the idea of an NWFZ on the Korean 
peninsula. Nobody heeded to his idea that time; George W. Bush 
only withdrew all US nuclear weapons from South Korea. This 
helped in the signing of the 1992 Joint Declaration of the 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. But it was realised that 
South Korea though stationed no American nuclear weapons, it 
enjoyed extended nuclear umbrella from the USA, making it a 
crypto nuclear weapon state. Still, Pyongyang concluded the 
safeguard agreement with the IAEA, following which, nuclear 
inspection of North Korea‘s programme started.  
Serious tensions arose between the US and North Korea over the 
issue of the scope and level of nuclear investigation in 1992. 
Meanwhile, the US carried out Team Spirit joint military exercise 
with South Korea. Subsequently, the USA stepped up diplomatic 
efforts and signed an Agreed Framework with North Korea in 1994 
under which DPRK agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons 
ambition in exchange for aid from US, Japan, South Korea through 
the KEDO project. The US conditionally agreed to provide help for 
two light water reactors but were intentionally delayed as alleged 
by DPRK. Post-9/11, US sent negative signals to North Korea by 
including it in the ‗axis of evil‘ states and listing it in its Nuclear 
Posture Review of 2002 as a country against which the US should 
be prepared to use nuclear weapons (Roblin, 2018) and plan for 
regime change, while stopping fuel oil deliveries. In protest, North 
Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
in 2003 and that led to the consequent escalation of the Korean 
imbroglio.  
On the other hand, North Korea‘s provocative actions, rhetoric, and 
brinkmanship have equally deteriorated the situation inviting 
stringent sanctions and US-South Korea military assertiveness. 
There are many reported incidents of North Korean involvement in 
bomb attacks in South Korea, hijacking of the airline, attempt to kill 
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President Park Chung-Hee, attacks on warship near the border, 
and so forth. A North Korean submarine's torpedo sank a South 
Korean navy ship on 26 March 2010 causing the deaths of 46 sailors 
(BBC, 2010). All these have culminated in the current strategic 
imbroglio in the region which have serious global implications. 
4. Six-Party Talks 
Giving diplomacy a chance to persuade North Korea to roll back its 
nuclear weapons program, a series of multilateral negotiations 
involving six parties – China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South 
Korea, and the United States (known as ‗Six-Party Talks‘) – were 
held intermittently since 2003. China hosted and led the talks and 
arrived at critical breakthroughs in 2005. North Korea pledged to 
abandon ―all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs‖ and 
return to the NPT and in 2007 the parties agreed on a series of steps 
to implement that 2005 agreement (Kelsey, 2018). However, all the 
steps were not fulfilled except the shutting and sealing of the 
Yongbyon reactor that produced plutonium for its weapons 
program.  
Toward the end of the George W. Bush administration, six-party 
talks grounded to a halt as North Korea did not agree on specific 
IAEA verification measures of its nuclear activities. Subsequently, 
it conducted a satellite launch, believed to be the testing of its ICBM 
technology defying all international pressure. In 2009, Pyongyang 
decided to pull out from the six-party process expelling all IAEA 
inspectors from the country and resumed the nuclear enrichment 
program in order to boost its nuclear deterrent. The Korean 
peninsula once again became the hotspot of the world giving a 
sense of nuclear flash point. After the Cheonan crisis, North Korea 
conducted an underground nuclear test on May 25, 2009. In 
November same year another exchange of fire, the Battle of 
Daecheong took place where North Korea reportedly sustained 
heavy casualties (Revolvy, 2010). On 23 November 2010, North 
Korea shelled South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island killing two South 
Korean soldiers (The Telegraph, 2010). 
Amidst all these, China has periodically called for the resumption 
of the talk process. But only in February 2012, the United States and 
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North Korea announced a ―leap day‖ agreement to provide 
substantial food aid in return for the North agreeing to a 
moratorium on uranium enrichment and missile testing and a 
return of IAEA inspectors to Yongbyon, leading to a resumption of 
the six-party talks (Reuters, 2012). Till 2014, attempts were made to 
bring North Korea back to the negotiating table but without avail. 
The six-party talks though aimed to find a peaceful resolution of 
the conflict in the Korean peninsula, by allaying security fears of 
North Korea, it did not succeed.  
5. The ‘Security Deficit’ 
There are compelling reasons why diplomacy has suffered a 
serious setback with regard to the conflict resolution in the Korean 
peninsula. The Super Power presence in Korean peninsula 
especially America‘s security umbrella over its allies undoubtedly 
has generated substantial ‗security deficit‘ for others. North Korea‘s 
closeness with China is inadequate to balance its adversarial 
relations with America and South Korea which is an ally of the 
former. The presence of 70,000 American troops during the late 
1950s in South Korea which has been reduced to 28,000 today is no 
less threatening. Justifications for the US troop presence is often 
expressed in the following manner: ―the American presence stifles 
the urge for Seoul to take other, more destabilizing steps to ensure 
its safety — such as developing nuclear weapons of its own. When 
the American military appeared to be pulling back from Asia in the 
1970s, in fact, South Korea took steps toward building a nuclear 
arsenal. Since then, there has been a tacit bargain: The U.S. 
maintains a tangible, visible commitment to South Korea and South 
Korea foregoes the nuclear weapons it could easily develop. The 
U.S. troop presence is the key to deterrence and reassurance on the 
Korean Peninsula, bringing tenuous stability to an important part 
of the world‖ (Brands, 2018).  
Realistically, the benefits of this arrangement are inherently vague 
and ―counterfactual because they rely on judgments about the bad 
things that might happen if the U.S. stopped doing what it does‖ 
(Brands, 2018). The ‗security dilemma‘ created by the lopsided 
security management now dictates the regional strategic 
calculations. Therefore, North Korea proposes to provide the 
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Korean Peninsula with a NWFZ which is unacceptable to the USA. 
It has unambiguously laid out the following conditions or terms 
under which North Korea would be happy to denuclearise: 
1. The US and South Korea should allow international 
verification that all nuclear weapons previously stationed in 
South Korea have indeed been removed and remove any 
weapons that still remain. 
2. Guarantee that the US would never again deploy nuclear 
strike weapons on the Korean Peninsula and its 
surrounding region. 
3. Promise that no nuclear weapons will be used to threaten or 
attack North Korea. 
4. Declare an evacuation of the US army that owns the nuclear 
usage right in South Korea (Terry, 2018). 
More importantly, the precedents of America‘s interventions in 
other parts of the world seem to guide the authoritarian regime in 
North Korea to look for regime survival options desperately. 
Reliance on China or Russia would not be viable as the USA can 
influence them at ease. Also, none of these countries would risk 
annoying Washington in favour of Pyongyang. North Korea‘s 
autocratic leader is aware that except nuclear weapons, no amount 
of conventional weapons build-up can bridge the persisting 
security deficit. It is not beyond his imagination that if Saddam 
Hussain had nuclear weapons, America would not have dared to 
intervene in Iraq. It is gradually unfolding that nuclear weapons 
with North Korea and its aggressive signalling have effectively 
deterred America to resort to ‗regime change‘ option. The Trump 
administration seems to be aware and is working to allay this fear. 
In an interview with Fox News, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 
said, ―We will have to provide security assurances to be sure 
….This has been the trade-off that has been pending for 25 years‖ 
(The Indian Express, 2018). Even President Trump decided to halt 
the planned joint military exercises with South Korea arguing that 
the US will ―save a fortune‖ (Stracqualursi, 2018). 
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6. Regional Strategic Imbroglio  
The inter-Korean rivalry, the involvement of USA, and the presence 
of nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula, has sufficient spillover 
effects on entire North Asia. As North Korea borders China and 
Russia, any military action on North Korea is bound to affect both. 
Moreover, the involvement of the USA and its policies have 
generated concerns for other stakeholders. For example, China 
opposed to any deployment of nuclear weapons by Japan and 
South Korea in response to North Korea‘s capability. The 
―deployment or development of nuclear weapons in South Korea 
and Japan will bring them to the door step of China‖ (The 
Economic Times, 2017). Also, Beijing firmly opposes deployment of 
THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) system in South 
Korea by the USA because ―its powerful radars could monitor 
China‘s movement of missiles and their deployment‖ (Ibid).  
Olly Terry views that China and Russia would support the North 
Korean demand for NWFZ, and aid in the removal of all military 
hardware through international verification. But these are ―unlikely 
to be attractive to the US which gains huge strategic advantage 
from having troops and military hardware‖ in South Korea. The 
legitimacy and justification of US presence would also disappear if 
Korean NWFZ is established and the North Korean threat removed 
(Terry, 2018).  
Another important regional player, ―Japan faces an existential 
crisis‖ for the nuclear developments in the Korean peninsula. Many 
Japanese citizens were allegedly abducted by North Korea. Japan, 
an ally of America that has stationed American troops and enjoys 
US nuclear umbrella, is an easy target within easy reach of North 
Korean missiles. In response, Japan follows the international 
multilateral sanction directives and frozen assets of 103 private 
companies of North Korea after it‘s nuclear and missile tests. Tokyo 
is determined not to relax the sanctions imposed unless until the 
abduction issue is amicably resolved.  
Meanwhile, China has a clear agenda on the Korean peninsula but 
it is under tremendous pressure to take the lead in brokering peace 
in the Korean Peninsula. South Korea and the US want China to 
shut-off the oil pipeline that runs into North Korea under the Yalu 
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River ―for a couple of months‖ before the winter, to see if fuel 
shortages would compel Pyongyang to negotiate (Perlez, 2017). 
China had to stop the import of coal and iron ore from North Korea 
and did not export oil products in November. China seems to have 
consistently and strictly enforced relevant UN Security Council 
resolutions on North Korea. However, given their ideological 
proximity and long-standing relationship, it would be difficult to 
fathom the exact volume of China-North Korea trade that is 
continuing still. Obviously, China has an upper hand in Korean 
affairs but with its own agenda and strategic calculations. 
Russia, as a neighbour, is equally concerned about the successive 
launches of ballistic missiles and nuclear test by North Korea. 
Moscow ―attaches great importance to safeguarding the 
international non-proliferation regime and upholding the goal of a 
nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.‖ It particularly emphasises that 
―North Korea‘s security should also be taken into consideration 
and North Korea‘s reasonable concerns should be respected‖ 
(Guangcheng, 2017). On the issue of the THAAD system, Russia 
makes it clear that this move will seriously damage the strategic 
security interests of the countries in the region, including China 
and Russia, and will not contribute to achieving the goal of a 
nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and the peace and stability in the 
region (Sinha, 2018). ―China and Russia have adopted an almost 
identical stance on the issue of North Korea‘s nuclear crisis‖ 
(Guangcheng, 2017). 
Therefore, building consensus between the major stakeholders like 
China, Russia and Japan to adopt diplomatic options, instead of 
sanctions and aggressive posture, is inevitable for any security 
balancing act in the Korean Peninsula. No amount of economic 
punishment would hold back the ‗intent‘ for nuclear weapons. In 
addition, the regional grouping ASEAN can contribute and play a 
constructive role in helping to usher in peace and stability in the 
Korean peninsula. Since 2000, ASEAN has supplied a venue for 
dialogue between North Korea and the international community. 
(Strait Times, 2018) 
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7. Learn to Live with Nuclear  
Nuclearised Korean peninsula is a reality today and its 
denuclearization is a difficult proposition. The incentive is neither 
lucrative nor there available a conducive regional environment to 
expect Pyongyang to adopt a desired path. All concerned must 
introspect to understand and nurture a regional atmosphere that 
would automatically facilitate the smooth return of a prodigal son 
to the nonproliferation regime. The idea of an NWFZ for Korea was 
never taken seriously by the US. As long as America insists on 
nothing less than the Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible 
Disarmament (CVID) of North Korea‘s nuclear programme, instead 
of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Korean peninsula without a 
reciprocal withdrawal of its nuclear umbrella over South Korea, 
―North Korea is not going to give up any pieces of its deterrent‖ 
(Korda, 2018). Whatever promise Pyongyang has made in the 
Singapore summit recently can be taken back by it later! 
Considering the level and magnitude of North Korea‘s nuclear 
programme today, even if Pyongyang accedes or succumb to 
pressure which is unlikely, ―the denuclearization process may take 
up to 15 years to complete in which case even the January 2021 
target will be impossible to achieve ‖( Kan, 2018).  North Korea 
has conducted six nuclear tests so far (2006, 2009, 2013, twice in 
2016, and 2017), the last one being claimed as a thermonuclear 
device. It is speculated that Pyongyang may have 13 to 21 
warheads by now. The dismantling of North Korea‘s entire nuclear 
weapons infrastructure with multilateral verification process 
would be a long-drawn process. What is crucial, therefore, is 
arresting DPRK‘s ‗felt need‘ and ‗intent‘ for nuclear weapons. 
Unless the root cause – security deficit – is addressed, there would 
be no rolling back of its programme. Without addressing insecurity 
perception, no qualitative change in the Korean strategic 
environment can be achieved.  
Therefore, the options for achieving regional peace in Korea are 
limited. If America pays a second thought in its strategic interests 
in the region by reorienting its equations with its allies while 
assuring non-intervention in North Korea, de-link its strategic 
presence vis-à-vis China and Russia, then Pyongyang might forgo 
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its nuclear brinkmanship; lest, the world has to learn to live with 
the nuclear North Korea and a nuclearised peace in Korean 
peninsula. Though ‗nuclear myth‘ (nuclear weapons provides 
ultimate guarantee of peace) dictates countries to opt for nuclear 
deterrence, ‗nuclear taboo‘ does not permit to use the bomb as 
nuclear war cannot be won. Mutual assured destruction (MAD) in 
a nuclear exchange will make no one a victor or a vanquished. It 
would be safe to assume that the North Korean leader would pile 
up a sizable nuclear inventory to acquire sufficient deterrent 
capability, but not to go down on the path of destruction by 
resorting to their actual use.  
More importantly, the ‗domino effect‘ of nuclear weapons with 
North Korea would be felt sooner or later in Japan and South Korea 
which is in no one‘s interest. Certainly, America is to be blamed for 
introducing nuclear weapons to the region setting on the 
proliferation chain. Hypothetically, nuclear weapons capable Japan 
and South Korea will certainly validate the process of ‗decline of 
America‘ as the sole superpower, heralding the ―post-Western 
world‖ order where there would be many ‗great powers‘ instead of 
superpowers, in a regionalised or defused world order.  
8. India’s Stakes 
Though India‘s stakes in the current Korean crisis are large, New 
Delhi ―does not enjoy much clout in the region compared to other 
regional players like China and Russia because of its physical 
distance‖ (Sajjanhar, 2017). Historically, India had played a ―much 
overlooked but significant role‖ in bringing the Korean conflict of 
the 1950s to an end (Ramesh, 2017). Jawaharlal Nehru with support 
from his aides like B.N. Rau, K.M. Panikkar, V.K. Krishna Menon 
crafted and successfully executed the peace campaign that resulted 
in the unanimous adoption of the Indian resolution at the UN. 
Subsequently ―Menon submitted another proposal in 1953 to the 
UN, which, however, was not acceptable to the Americans who 
came up with their own version. But they agreed to merge their 
resolution with Menon‘s to move things forward. This was then to 
lead to the Armistice Agreement‖ (Ibid) of July 1953 that heralded 
truce, though uneasy, in the region. 
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The strategic environment in Korean peninsula during the 1950s 
and India‘s role in it cannot be extrapolated to the current scenario 
in the region. But the strategic developments and outcomes in the 
region have serious implications for India. The first concern for 
India would be the difficulty in meeting the China challenge if ―any 
diminution of the US role in Asia‖ occurs (Objectiveias, 2018). 
Second, India cannot be a muted spectator of the imminent nuclear 
proliferation chain in the neighbourhood. If Seoul and Tokyo break 
out from American nuclear umbrella arrangement and acquire 
nuclear weapons of their own, Asia would be the most crowded 
nuclear weapons continent. This scenario is not in the best interest 
of India which has championed the philosophy of nuclear 
nonproliferation and disarmament. Third, the North Korean 
nuclear technology may find a way to Pakistan as a proliferation 
network thrived between them. 
Though India cannot turn a blind eye towards North Korea‘s 
belligerence, its space for diplomatic manoeuvre is limited given 
the intricate rivalry among major powers in the region. Owing to 
long physical distance and less economic dependency, India‘s 
influence on North Korea is low. The volume of trade between the 
two is small; even though India has been North Korea‘s second 
largest trade partner after China (Pant, 2018). India‘s trade turnover 
with North Korea was around USD 200 million with exports of 
USD 111 million and imports of around 90 million in 2016 
(Sajjanhar). But bilateral trade has come down drastically since 
2016-17 for India‘s strict adherence to UN sanctions of provisions. 
India has stopped all trade transactions, especially exports of 
petroleum products, except for food and medicine supplies. 
Reportedly, India was one of the few countries in the world that 
provided technical training for North Korean students at the Centre 
for Space Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific 
(CSSTEAP), Dehradun, even after the UN imposed the first set of 
sanctions in 2006 (Bhowmick, 2016) which has been refuted by 
India‘s MEA as ―baseless and without any merit‖ (Bhattacherjee, 
2016). Currently, India‘s economic transactions with North Korea 
are abysmal. One major concern that India must take note is that 
North Korea will be forced to depend more on China. Furthermore, 
economic sanctions have limited impact on nuclear proliferation 
behaviour.   
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Nevertheless, India has a cordial relationship with every actor in 
the region giving it a moral and neutral high ground. The United 
States, therefore, expects India to play an active role in dealing with 
the Korean nuclear crisis. Admiral Harry Harris, commander of the 
US Pacific Command, said ―…India's voice is a loud voice, that 
people pay attention to. So, I think that India could help North 
Korea, perhaps, understand the seriousness by which the United 
States views that threat‖ (NDTV, 2017). Harsh V. Pant (2018) says, 
as India has her own equities to preserve in North Korea, it is for 
India to decide on what kind of role it wants to play in diffusing 
the rising tension between the US and North Korea. In the past, 
despite US pressure, India has refused to reduce its diplomatic 
engagement with Pyongyang and has not been supportive of UN 
resolutions. Reportedly, ―New Delhi refused a request from U.S. 
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to shut down its diplomatic mission 
in Pyongyang altogether‖ (The Livemint, 2017). India feels that 
there is an imperative to maintain a diplomatic presence in North 
Korea which can be useful for the USA as a channel of 
communication. India‘s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj 
could manage to convince Tillerson of the need for India to 
maintain a diplomatic presence underlining that ―some of their 
[US] friendly countries should maintain embassies there so that 
some channels of communication are kept open‖ (Landay, 2017). 
This does not mean that India is sympathetic towards North 
Korea‘s missile and nuclear ambitions. India has toughened its 
stand on the nuclear and missile proliferation activities by 
Pyongyang, and vehemently highlights its linkage with the 
Pakistan-led proliferation network.  
So far India‘s approach towards the Korean issues has been 
cautious and pragmatic. By avoiding bandwagoning with the 
‗pressure campaign‘ and warmongering provocations by America 
and her allies, India advocates diplomatic methods for peaceful 
resolution of the Korean crisis. India can shoulder certain 
responsibility as an emerging global player, and a stable and 
peaceful Korean peninsula is in India‘s best interest. India 
welcomes Donald Trump‘s summit meeting initiative with the 
North Korean leader. In fact, during the meeting between US 
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Canadian counterpart Chrystia 
Freeland in Ottawa, USA announced India‘s name as one of the 
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important parties along with Republic of Korea, Japan, Sweden, 
and the Vancouver Group ―to discuss North Korea‘s nuclear threat 
and ways to improve the effectiveness of the current pressure 
campaign against the reclusive nation‖ (PTI, 2017).  
As latest step, India‘s Minister of State for External Affairs General 
VK Singh paid a two day visit during 15-16 May 2018 to North 
Korea at the invitation of North Korea to hold talks with several 
leaders including Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho on ―a range of 
issues covering political, regional, economic, educational and 
cultural cooperation between the two countries‖ (MEA, 2018).  
According to the MEA statement, ―Singh highlighted the threat 
from nuclear proliferation, in particular, India‘s concerns in the 
context of the proliferation linkages with India‘s neighbourhood. 
The DPRK side emphasised that as a friendly country, DPRK will 
never allow any action that would create concerns for India‘s 
security‖ (MEA, 2016). The visit has surprised many for its secrecy 
and the timing when Pyongyang‘s threatened to cancel the 
scheduled talks with US President Donald Trump in Singapore in 
June 2018. 
9. A Word of Caution 
Any regional conflict involving nuclear weapons are normally 
protracted having no easy solutions. Given the secluded 
authoritarian regime in North Korea and its nuclear brinkmanship, 
the issue is extremely delicate for diplomatic as well as military 
adventure. History provides no example of the Korean type to 
draw lessons from. Donald Trump‘s conciliatory approach looks 
pragmatic at this juncture even though not much is expected from 
North Korea in terms of nuclear disarmament. The aspired 
outcome of global efforts (rollback of North Korea‘s nuclear 
weapons programme) would largely depend on the future status of 
the US military presence in the Korean peninsula; positive 
equations among China, Russia, USA, Japan, etc. and, Kim‘s 
perception of his regime security. The traditional nonproliferation 
techniques involving pressure campaign through the imposition of 
economic sanctions, the threat of regime change, military 
intervention, UN resolutions, and so forth have never worked, and 
are unlikely to persuade North Korea for a U-turn in her nuclear 
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ambitions now. What is needed is an out-of-the-box approach or 
custom-designed package taking into account the target country‘s 
politico-strategic compulsions.  
As far as India‘s stakes are concerned, she need not go overboard 
or get carried away by the dictates of USA and others alike. She 
needs to keep in mind that the Korean crisis is largely created by 
the USA and its allies. Also, India needs to remember that 
superpower interventions in Asia have always been 
counterproductive, be it in the Gulf region, Afghanistan, Vietnam, 
or elsewhere. India should only be party to any constructive and 
peaceful approach in resolving the Korean crisis. India‘s pragmatic 
approach towards Afghanistan, though distinct from Korean 
theatre, could be considered as a good proposal. India‘s relatively 
quiet diplomatic steps involving Korean issues during the last 
couple of years may give an impression that ―India is trying to 
quietly rebuild ties with the reclusive regime, ostracised by most of 
the world due to its defiance of UNSC norms on nuclear weapons‖ 
(Haidar, 2018). It is unclear ―what‘s behind India‘s recent outreach 
to North Korea‖(Pant, 2018). India can go the extra mile in 
brokering peace in the Korean peninsula and helping North Korea 
to economically stabilise, provided it opens up to the world 
positively discarding its nuclear jingoism. However, it is early to 
arrive at any conclusion as ―North Korea can be highly 
unpredictable‖ (Ibid). India‘s cordial ties with South Korea, Japan 
and USA make it more sensitive and a delicate diplomatic issue to 
pay half-hazard attention. Moreover, the outcomes of the Korean 
crisis will have serious spillover effects on South and East Asia in 
which India cannot be a mute spectator. Therefore, any decision to 
enter the Korean fray should be taken with utmost caution and 
pragmatism. 
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